To avoid that the central authority is under an undue influence it shall be composed of representatives of various public institutions (for example, Public Defender of Rights (ombudsman), Supreme Audit Authority, Supreme Administrative Court and/or Constitutional Court) so that influencing its decision-making is as difficult as possible and the authority is not misused as a political weapon.
If the surveillance over the compliance with the rules on the conflict of interest was granted to a central authority composed of various institutions without being under an undue influence. The current control over conflict of interest of politicians is dysfunctional. Local hierarchically subordinate politician acting as controlling authority can never effectively control or punish a politician acting at the central level who is hierarchically superior to him
Sources:
- Report of the European Commission on the fight against corruption in the EU, Annex Czech Republic, Annex 3, COM(2014) 38 final , p. 7
- OECD: Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, point 2.3.3, p. 12 - 13
- Transparency International Czech Republic, Conflict of interest – Czech Republic [online], p. 9 - 11
- Vondráček, O., Havrda, M., 21 recipes – Anti-corruption cookbook, Recipe 1: Reducing corruption opportunities, December 2013
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